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Abstract—As a result of high-tech companies such as
Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft offering free email services,
email has become a primary channel of communication.
However, email service providers have traditionally offered
little in the way of message privacy protection. This has made
emails, of which billions are sent around the world on any day,
an attractive data source for personal identity information
thieves. Google was one of the ﬁrst companies to provide
substantial email privacy protection when they began using
the HTTPS always-on option to encrypt messages sent through
their email service, Gmail. Unfortunately, Gmail’s encryption
option does not offer true point-to-point encryption since the
encrypted emails are decrypted and stored in plaintext form
on Google’s servers. This type of approach poses a security
vulnerability which is unacceptable to security-minded users
such as highly sensitive government agencies and private
companies. For these users, true point-to-point encryption
is needed. This paper introduces an identity-based one-way
group key agreement protocol and describes a point-to-point
email encryption scheme based on the protocol. Both the
security proofs and the efﬁciency analysis, with experimental
results, of the new scheme are provided.
Keywords: P2P encryption; Identity-based encryption; One-
way group-key agreement; Bilinear pairings
I. INTRODUCTION
Email has evolved into one of the most important and
widely used communication channels for both individuals
and organizations. However, despite email’s ubiquity in al-
most all parts of the world, current industry standards do not
emphasize email security. In fact, most emails are currently
transmitted as plain text across the Internet and other public
networks. Additionally, email servers often backup messages
in order to ensure the message’s delivery in the face of a
network failure. Since attackers can potentially read, copy,
and alter every un-encrypted email sent over networks or
stored on a mail server, there is an urgent need for point-to-
point (P2P) email encryption.
Among the most popular webmail services; namely Hot-
mail, Yahoo mail, and Google’s Gmail; Gmail has done the
most to protect users’ privacy by using the https (http secure)
always-on option to encrypt emails as they travel between a
web browser and Gmail servers. This procedure helps protect
data from being eavesdropped on by third parties during data
transmission at the cost of higher CPU usage and latency.
However, it does not offer protection against attackers who
are able to gain access, either physically or remotely, to
Google servers since all emails are decrypted and stored in
plain text form on those servers. In this case, the attacker
would be able to read and/or alter every email on the server;
P2P encryption is needed to prevent such an attack. The
following sequence of events describes the process used by
Gmail to send an email:
Sender writes email and clicks “Send”
=⇒ Sender’s browser encrypts email and transmits it to
Gmail Server =⇒ Gmail server decrypts and stores email
=⇒ Gmail server re-encrypts and sends email to recipient
=⇒ Recipient’s browser loads and decrypts email
This https procedure relies on the Transport Layer Secure
(TLS) protocol [1] to achieve session key agreement be-
tween the sender and Gmail server and the Gmail server and
the email’s ultimate recipient. The two session key agree-
ments are needed since the Gmail server must decrypt each
message using the session key shared with the sender and
later re-encrypt and send the message using the session key
shared with the email recipient. This can be quite expensive
since each TLS key agreement requires the transmission of
several back-and-forth handshake messages.
In contrast, P2P encryption requires a single encryption
by the sender and a single decryption by the recipient;
no server side encryption or decryption is needed. The
following sequence of events illustrates the sending of an
email using P2P encryption:
Sender writes email and clicks “Send”
=⇒ Sender’s browser encrypts email and transmits it to
email server =⇒ email server stores email =⇒ email server
sends email to recipient =⇒ Recipient’s browser loads and
decrypts email
P2P encryption compares favorably to the Gmail https
protocol since it does not require server side encryp-
tion/decryption and can thus forego the two TLS handshakes.
In theory, the adoption of a P2P email encryption scheme
would reduce server load and thus latency.
P2P encryption requires the adoption of one of the fol-
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lowing approaches:
1) Before two users communicate, they establish and
share an encryption key which they will use for future
communications.
2) Each email user determines a private/public key set
and publishes their public key.
3) The email sender and recipient ﬁnd a way to agree on
an encryption key without the need for an information
exchanging handshake since the recipient might not
be online when the email is sent.
The ﬁrst approach does not scale well since it requires
sharing a different key with each potential email recipient.
The second approach has been adopted by the well-known
PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) [2], [3] secure email protocol,
which requires each PGP user to have his/her own public
and private key pair. In PGP, an email sender needs to know
the public key of the email’s recipient prior to the encryption
of the message. This is often achieved by querying a public-
key certiﬁcate authority (CA) to retrieve (or verify) the
recipient’s public key. While this approach scales well, it
has some serious disadvantages such as:
1) all participants need to decide upon and publish public
keys.
2) it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a trusted third party to act as the
CA.
3) tracking valid and revoked certiﬁcates requires extra
work on behalf of the CA.
4) public key encryption is computationally expensive.
Identity-based cryptography (IBC) is a promising solution
to these issues. In IBC, everyone’s public key is generated
from a unique identiﬁer; for instance, an individual’s email
address. A trusted key distribution center (KDC) uses a
cryptographic algorithm to calculate the private key for a
public key and sends the pair of keys to the participant. Since
both the public key generation algorithm and the input to the
algorithm (i.e. email address) are publicly available, anyone
is able to calculate another’s public key on the ﬂy without
needing to querying a server. Studies have shown that an IBC
system requires a signiﬁcantly less complex infrastructure
(fewer servers and easier installation) and lower operating
costs and user productivity losses (one-ﬁfth and one-third
of the values, respectively) compared to a typical public-
key system. [6]
This paper proposes an identity-based one-way group
key agreement protocol for email encryption. The proposed
protocol allows email participants to agree on a symmetric
key using encryption algorithms, such as AES [4], which
are far more efﬁcient than those involving an IBC public
key.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
related work. Section III gives the cryptographic background
needed to understand this paper. It includes a brief intro-
duction to bilinear pairings, the associated cryptographically
hard problems, and a typical identity-based cryptosystem.
Section IV describes the identity-based one-way group key
agreement protocol. Section V shows security proofs for
the protocol. Section VI provides an efﬁciency analysis of
the proposed P2P email encryption scheme and includes
a detailed comparison with the well-known PGP program.
Section VII presents the performance results of the new
scheme. Finally, Section VIII summarizes the proposed work
and concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
PGP is a secure protocol which enables P2P email en-
cryption. If a person wishes to use PGP to send a secure
email, he/she needs to:
1) encrypt the email using the IDEA encryption algo-
rithm [5],
2) ﬁnd and verify the email recipient’s RSA public key
[7],
3) encrypt the IDEA encryption key using the email
recipient’s RSA public-key.
The encrypted email can then be sent over a regular emailing
system. Upon receiving a PGP-encrypted email, a user needs
to
1) use his/her RSA private key to get the IDEA encryp-
tion key,
2) use the IDEA key to decrypt the email.
The emailing processes listed above are all fairly easy
to implement with the exception of ﬁnding and verifying
an email recipient’s public keys. While getting someone’s
public key is fairly straightforward, often requiring the
querying of a public directory, verifying the received key
requires a CA’s signature of endorsement. This is the main
disadvantage of public-key cryptosystems, including PGP,
and is even more of a problem when an email is sent
to multiple recipients. In that case, the sender needs to
perform the troublesome public-key veriﬁcation process for
each recipient. The proposed identity-based one-way group
key agreement protocol does not require the public-key
veriﬁcation process and its associated costs.
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND
A. Bilinear pairings
Bilinear pairing is a popular cryptosystem which has
found recent use in various efﬁcient encryption and signature
schemes [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. A symmetric
bilinear pairings cryptosystem is described brieﬂy in this
section.
Let (G1,+) and (G2,×) be two cyclic groups of the same
prime order, q, and let B be the generator of the additive
group G1, and e : G1 ×G1 → G2 is a bilinear mapping if
it has the following properties:
Bilinearity:
∀X,Y, Z ∈ G1, and ∀a, b ∈ Z∗q ,
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e(X,Y ) = e(Y,X)
e(aX, bY ) = e(X,Y )ab = e(bX, aY )
e(X,Y + Z) = e(X,Y )e(X,Z)
Non-degeneracy:
If B is a generator of G1, then e(B,B) is a
generator of G2.
Computability:
∀X,Y ∈ G1 , there exists a polynomial-time algo-
rithm to efﬁciently compute the bilinear mapping
e(X,Y ).
An elliptic curve is a typical example for the G1 group
[15], [16]. The security of most bilinear mapping based
cryptographic schemes is related to the difﬁculty of the
bilinear variants of the Difﬁe-Hellman problems, which are:
• Computational Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman Problem (CB-
DHP): Given X, aX, bX for a, b ∈ Z∗q , compute abX .
• Decision Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman Problem (DBDHP):
Given X, aX, bX, cX for a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , and an element
g ∈ G2, decide if g = e(X,X)abc.
Currently, there is no known algorithm which is able to
efﬁciently solve these hard problems.
B. Identity-based cryptosystem
In a typical public-key cryptosystem, a trusted third party
must serve as a CA by providing public-key endorsement
services for registered users. The disadvantages of having
such certiﬁcate authorities were discussed earlier in this
paper. Identity-based cryptography is remarkable in that it
does not require a CA. Instead, a public known hash function
can be used to derive a participant’s public key from the
participant’s identity token.
While identity-based cryptosystems do not require a CA,
most implementations require a central server, called a key
distribution center (KDC), to generate and distribute the
public/private key pair for users when they ﬁrst register.
KDCs differ from CAs in that they do not need to up-and-
running all the time and they don’t need to provide public-
key veriﬁcation services for each communication.
The KDC needs to deﬁne a set of cryptographic parame-
ters and make them publicly known. A typical identity-based
cryptosystem setting is as follows:
1) The KDC chooses two cyclic groups (G1,+) and
(G2,×) of the same prime order q. Let B be a
generator of the order q over G1 and e : G1 ×G1 →
G2 be a bilinear mapping.
2) The KDC also chooses a cryptographic hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 that can map a user’s identity
to a point in G1. The map-to-curve and map-to-point
algorithms from Weil pairings in [17], [18] are such
functions.
3) The KDC selects a master secret S ∈ Z∗q .
4) Finally, the KDC publishes the set of cryptographic
parameters {G1, G2, q, B, e,H}.
5) Each registered user Ui will have a public key Pi.
Pi = H(IDi) ∈ G1 (1)
where IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the identity of the user Ui.
The KDC calculates a private key Si and sends it to
Ui through a secure channel, where
Si = S × Pi ∈ G1 (2)
IV. ONE-WAY GROUP KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL FOR
P2P EMAIL ENCRYPTION
This section proposes the identity-based one-way group
key agreement protocol and describes its application to P2P
email encryption.
A. KDC server
For the proposed one-way group key agreement protocol
to allow an email sender and a group of recipients to
agree on a key for P2P email encryption, all of the email’s
participants must have public-private keys issued by the
same KDC. This can easily be achieved by letting the email
service provider act as the KDC. In that case, when a
user registered an account with the company, the company’s
email server would act as the KDC and would generate the
user’s public key and private key using the steps described
in Section III-B. However, since the service provider knows
the master secret key, S, they would be able to derive every
user’s private key. With the private key, they could determine
the user’s encryption key and subsequently decrypt any
of their emails. The service provider would have strong
incentives for decrypting user emails since it would allow
for more efﬁcient indexing, better spam detection, and more
effective ad-targeting.
For this reason, highly sensitive organizations such as
government agencies would probably want to have their own
server running as the KDC to use their own set of identity-
based cryptographic parameters. An agency’s use of its own
server as the KDC does not limit the email service providers
which could be used by the agency’s employees. On the
contrary, it allows for secure P2P email encryption across
most networks. Only the agency’s KDC and the email’s
recipients (if they are registered users of the agency), who
can use the agency’s set of cryptographic parameters to
determine the key for the email’s encryption, will be able to
decrypt the email.
B. Key generation by email sender
In any email application, a sender can email a message
to a group of n > 0 recipients. Assume ID0 is the email
sender’s identity (i.e. the sender’s email address) and let IDi,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, denote the identity for each of the n
email recipients.
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1) The email sender picks a random number r ∈ Z∗q and
computes
xi = e(S0, rPi) ∈ G2,∀i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n (3)
where S0 is the private key of the email sender ID0
and Pi = H(IDi) is the public key of the email
recipient IDi.
2) The email sender generates the encryption key K by
computing
K = ⊕∀i=0,1,...,n(xi) (4)
3) The email sender also computes yi,∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
as follows.
yi = ⊕∀j =i(xj) (5)
in other words,
yi = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ . . .⊕ xi−1 ⊕ xi+1 ⊕ . . .⊕ xn (6)
4) The email sender encrypts the email using the secret
key K and sends the encrypted email out along with
(r, y1, y2, . . . , yn).
C. Key re-generation by each email recipient
Upon receiving the email from ID0, each recipient IDi
can compute the secret key K from yi (which is attached in
the email) and the public key P0 = H(ID0) of the email
sender ID0 with the following equation:
K = yi ⊕ e(rP0, Si) (7)
since
yi ⊕ e(rP0, Si) = yi ⊕ e(rP0, sPi)
= yi ⊕ e(sP0, rPi)
= yi ⊕ e(S0, rPi)
= yi ⊕ xi
= (⊕∀j =i(xj))⊕ xi
= K
D. Example
The security proofs in the next section distinguish between
the case where an email has an even number of recipients
and the case where an email has an odd number of recipients.
Thus, in this section we will provide an example for each
case. To start, assume an email sender, with identity ID0,
would like to send an email to two (an even number)
recipients with identities ID1 and ID2. This scenario would
be handled as follows:
1) The sender picks a random number r and computes⎧⎨
⎩
x0 = e(S0, rP0)
x1 = e(S0, rP1)
x2 = e(S0, rP2)
2) The sender generates the encryption key
K = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2
3) The sender computes{
y1 = x0 ⊕ x2
y2 = x0 ⊕ x1
4) The sender encrypts the email using the key K and
sends (r, y1, y2) along with the email.
5) The recipient with identity ID1 computes
y1 ⊕ e(rP0, S1) = x0 ⊕ x2 ⊕ e(rP0, SP1)
= x0 ⊕ x2 ⊕ e(sP0, rP1)
= x0 ⊕ x2 ⊕ e(S0, rP1)
= x0 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x1
= K
6) The recipient with identity ID2 computes
y2 ⊕ e(rP0, S2) = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ e(rP0, SP2)
= x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ e(sP0, rP2)
= x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ e(S0, rP2)
= x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2
= K
Thus, both email recipients are able to derive the
encryption key K which was generated by the email’s
sender.
Now, assume an email sender with identity ID0 would
like to send an email to three (an odd number) recipients
with identities ID1, ID2, and ID3. This scenario would be
handled as follows:
1) The sender picks a random number r and computes⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
x0 = e(S0, rP0)
x1 = e(S0, rP1)
x2 = e(S0, rP2)
x3 = e(S0, rP3)
2) The sender generates the encryption key
K = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3
3) The sender computes⎧⎨
⎩
y1 = x0 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3
y2 = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x3
y3 = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2
4) The sender encrypts the email using the key K and
sends (r, y1, y2, y3) along with the email.
5) The recipient with identity ID1 computes
y1 ⊕ e(rP0, S1) = x0 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ e(rP0, SP1)
= x0 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ e(sP0, rP1)
= x0 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ e(S0, rP1)
= x0 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x1
= K
6) The recipient with identity ID2 computes
y2 ⊕ e(rP0, S2) = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ e(rP0, SP2)
= x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ e(sP0, rP2)
= x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ e(S0, rP2)
= x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x2
= K
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7) The recipient with identity ID3 computes
y3 ⊕ e(rP0, S3) = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ e(rP0, SP3)
= x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ e(sP0, rP3)
= x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ e(S0, rP3)
= x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3
= K
Thus, all three email recipients are able to derive the
encryption key K which was generated by the email’s
sender.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide proofs showing that the encryp-
tion key K cannot be derived from the public information
{y1, y2, . . . , yn} alone. Let’s deﬁne the encryption key K
and all yi’s as sets, since we will consider these quantities
as sets in our security analysis.
Deﬁnition V-1: the encryption key K deﬁned in Equation (4)
is a set of elements {x0, x1, . . . , xn} that are linked together
by the ⊕ operator.
Deﬁnition V-2: A subset, s, of K is a subset of
{x0, x1, . . . , xn}, where all elements in the subset are linked
together by the ⊕ operator. Thus, the yi’s deﬁned in Equa-
tion (5) are all subsets of K.
To prove the security of the proposed scheme, we need to
answer the question: What subsets of K are required in order
to determine K?
Theorem V-1: A set of subsets of K, denoted by G =
{s1, s2, . . . , st} for some positive integer t, can be joined
with the ⊕ operator to yield K if and only if every element
of K appears an odd number of times in G.
Proof: Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that d > 0
elements of K, namely {xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xid}, appear an even
(or zero) number of times in G = {s1, s2, . . . , st}, where
s1⊕ s2⊕ . . .⊕ st = K. The remaining n− d+1 elements,
namely {xj1 , xj2 , . . . , xjn−d+1} must appear an odd number
of times in G. Let (⊕xi)r represent the operation xi⊕xi⊕
. . . ⊕ xi, where xi appears r times (xi XOR’ed with itself
r − 1 times). Note that
(xi)r =
{
xi if r is an odd number
0 if r is an even number
Now consider
G = s1 ⊕ s2 ⊕ . . .⊕ st
= [(⊕xi1)α1 ⊕ (⊕xi2)α2 ⊕ . . .⊕ (⊕xid)αd ] ⊕
[(⊕xj1)β1 ⊕ (⊕xj2)β2 ⊕ . . .⊕ (⊕xjn−d+1)βn−d+1 ]
= xj1 ⊕ xj2 ⊕ . . .⊕ xjn−d+1
where each αi is even ∀i ∈ [1, d] and each βj is odd ∀j ∈
[1, n− d + 1].
Having assumed that s1 ⊕ s2 ⊕ . . .⊕ st = K and having
shown that s1⊕s2⊕ . . .⊕st = xj1⊕xj2⊕ . . .⊕xjn−d+1 , we
can conclude that K = xj1 ⊕xj2 ⊕ . . .⊕xjn−d+1 . However,
this could only be true if d = 0, which contradicts our
previous assumption that d > 0. This contradiction proves
the theorem. ♦
Theorem V-2: A set of subsets of K, denoted by G, which
can be combined via ⊕ to yield K cannot be constructed
from a subset of Y = {y1, y2, . . . yn}, where the yi’s are
those which are deﬁned in Equation (5).
Proof: From the given set Y , let’s try to construct a set G
which can be XORed to yield K. Obviously G = ∅ and
G = {yi},∀i since in these cases G cannot be XORed to
get K.
Case |G| is even: Noting that x0 appears once in every yi
(see Equation (6) and the example in Section IV-D), if |G|
is even then x0 appears an even number of times in G. So
according to Theorem V-1, G cannot be XORed to yield K.
Case |G| is odd: In this case, every xi such that yi ∈ G
appears |G| − 1 times in G since xi appears once in every
yj ∈ G except yi (See Equation (5)). Because |G| is odd
and is greater than 1, |G| − 1 must be even and non-zero.
Thus, some elements xi’s of K appear an even number of
times in G. Again, according to Theorem V-I G cannot be
XORed to yield K.
Having covered all possible cases, we conclude that the
encryption key K cannot be derived from the given set Y =
{y1, y2, . . . yn}. ♦
VI. EFFICIENCY
In this section we analyze the proposed P2P email encryp-
tion scheme from several perspectives. First, we analyze the
server side computational cost of both user registration (i.e.
public/private key generation) and email transactions. Next,
we consider the computational cost from an email sender’s
perspective and an email recipient’s perspective. We assume
that the email was sent to n recipients. Finally, we analyze
the increase in the size of emails which are subject to our
P2P encryption scheme. Our analysis will use the following
notation for operations associated with the P2P scheme:
PM point multiplication in group G1
BP bilinear pairing
HASH map-to-point hash algorithm [17], [18].
Before we begin, we note that if a practical elliptic curve
E/F3163 is used to implement the group G1, then one
BP operation requires ≈ 11, 110 modular multiplications
in F3163 [19]. Meanwhile, a PM operation of E/F3163
requires only a few hundred modular multiplications in
F3163.
A. User registration
A new user registers an email account through the KDC
(e.g., Google server). After a user chooses his/her email
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address, the KDC uses the HASH and a PM to compute
the public and private key pair for the user. These two
key generations can be seen in Equations (1) and (2),
respectively. Both operations are quite efﬁcient and do not
represent a signiﬁcant cost.
B. Computational cost for an email sender
To send an email to n recipients, the sender is required
to
1) calculate x0, x1, x2, . . . , xn: From Equations (1) and
(3) we see that each computation requires a HASH,
PM, and BP operation.
2) derive the encryption key K. From Equation (4), this
derivation requires ⊕ing all xi’s.
3) calculate y1, y2, . . . , yn: From Equation (5), the calcu-
lation of each yi requires ⊕ing all xj’s ∀j = i.
4) AES encrypt the email using the encryption key K.
The bit-wise ⊕ operation is extremely efﬁcient, making
the costs for calculating K and yi’s negligible. From the
email sender’s perspective, the main computational cost
stems from the AES encryption and the calculation of
X = {x0, x1, . . . , xn}. Since each xi calculation requires a
HASH, a PM and a BP operation, the total cost of calculating
X is (n+1) HASH, (n+1) PM and (n+1) BP operations.
C. Computational cost for an email server
In contrast to the current Gmail behavior, the email server
from the proposed scheme is not required to perform any
decryption or encryption operations. However, encrypted
emails have an opportunity cost associated with them since
encryption makes spam ﬁltering and history searches more
difﬁcult.
D. Computational cost for an email recipient
To receive an email, a recipient needs to
1) re-construct the encryption key using Equation (7).
This requires One HASH, one PM and one BP op-
eration (the ⊕ operation is again ignored).
2) AES decrypt the message using the re-constructed
encryption key K.
We see that the computational cost of sending an email is
linearly proportional to the number of recipients while the
cost of receiving an email is constant.
E. Email size
The size of an email will increase as a result of using
the proposed P2P email encryption scheme. The ﬁrst, and
least signiﬁcant, cause of growth is the use of block ciphers
such as AES. These ciphers often require full blocks and
will consequently ﬁll the last block with random bits if it
is not full. This has the potential to add up to one block
minus a bit to the email’s size. Since most block sizes
are relatively small, AES has a block size of 256 bits, the
added size is usually not noticeable. A more signiﬁcant
increase in message size results from having to include the
key agreement information, (r, y1, y2, . . . , yn), with every
email. If an elliptic curve is used to implement the bilinear
pairing cryptosystem from the proposed P2P encryption
scheme, each member of the key agreement information
will be roughly the same size as the key of the selected
curve. According to the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, n-bit security (the security of a symmetric
encryption scheme with an n-bit key) requires an elliptic
curve with a key size ≈ 2n bits. So using an elliptic curve
and 128-bit security would result in a 256 × (n + 1) bit
increase in the size of an email sent to n recipients.
F. Comparison to the current Gmail setting
Table I provides a brief efﬁciency comparison between the
proposed P2P-EES and the current Gmail’s HTTPS always-
on option.
TABLE I
EFFICIENCY COMPARISON BETWEEN P2P-EES AND THE GMAIL’S
HTTPS ALWAYS-ON OPTION, ASSUMING THERE ARE n RECIPIENTS IN
AN EMAIL
P2P-EES Gmail’s HTTPS always-on
Email sender • (n + 1) PM; • TLS handshake with the
• (n + 1) BP; email server;
• (n + 1) HASH; • Email encryption.
• Email encryption.
Email server • None • TLS handshake with the
email sender;
• Email decryption
• TLS handshake with the
email recipient;
• Email re-encryption.
Email recipient • 1 PM; • TLS handshake with the
• 1 BP; email server;
• 1 HASH; • Email decryption.
• Email decryption.
Email size • Encrypted message • Encrypted message only.
along with all
yi’s (the key
agreement info).
VII. EXPERIMENTS
In addition to the theoretical performance analysis of
the P2P-EES, we implemented the P2P-EES prototype and
conducted experiments to measure the latency and storage
requirements for server cryptosystem setup, user registration,
and email transmission.
A. Implementation
The cryptosystem was implemented using a type A pairing
[20], [25], which is constructed on a curve E : y2 = x3 +x
over the ﬁeld Fq for some prime q = 3 mod 4. As a result,
E(Fq) contains q + 1 points and E(Fq2) contains (q + 1)2
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points. The group G = E(Fq)[r] is cyclic if r is an odd
number and a factor of q + 1. Consider the distortion map
in [21]
ψ(x, y) = (x, iy) (8)
where ψ maps points (x, y) ∈ E(Fq) to points in
E(Fq2)\E(Fq). If f denotes the Tate or Weil [22], [23],
[24] pairing, the bilinear mapping e : G×G → Fq2 can be
deﬁned by
e(P,Q) = f(P,ψ(Q)) (9)
An implementation for this type of pairing has been
suggested by [25] and is as follows:
1) An order r, of the group G, is chosen to be larger
enough to avoid generic discrete logarithm attacks.
r = 160 bits and r = 256 bits were used for our
experiments.
2) Choose a random number h such that it is a multiple
of 4 and (hr)2 is large enough to resist ﬁnite ﬁeld
attacks. For example, if one desires q2 to be 1024
bits long, then h must be ≈ 256 bits long (assuming
r = 256 bits).
3) Repeat step 2 while q = hr − 1 is not prime.
B. Experimental hardware
The experiments were conducted on a machine with an
Intel(R) Core(TM)i3CPU M330@2.13GHz processor, 4 GB
RAM, and the 64-bit Windows 7 home premium operating
system.
C. Cryptosystem setup
In a real application, the setup process needs to only be
performed once for a speciﬁc set of (rBits,qBits,MKBits)
values, where rBits is r’s bit size, qBits is q’s bit size, and
MKBits is the Master Key S’s bit size. For the performance
testing, the setup process was ran multiple times with differ-
ent (rBits,qBits,MKBits) values. Table II gives the execution
time for determining the parameters for the pairing system,
including the generation of the master key S.
TABLE II
SERVER PAIRING CRYPTOSYSTEM PARAMETERS SETUP
rBits qBits MKBits Time (ms: millisecond)
160 256 256 907
160 256 512 923
256 512 256 978
256 512 512 1239
D. User registration
After the setup process, the server writes the cryptosys-
tem’s parameters and master key to ﬁles. Upon receiving a
user registration request, a public and private key pair are
generated for the user. The key pair generation process was
described previously with Equations (1) and (2), where the
user’s email address is used as their unique ID. Table III
shows the execution time of key pair generation during our
experiments.
TABLE III
USER REGISTRATION - KEY PAIR GENERATION
rBits qBits MKBits email address Time (ms)
256 512 256 ﬁona201301@gmail.com 109
256 512 512 ﬁona201301@gmail.com 156
256 512 256 ﬁonazeng@u.boisestate.edu 125
256 512 512 ﬁonazeng@u.boisestate.edu 167
E. Email transmission
A Type A curve, with rBits = 256 and qBits = 512,
was used to measure encryption and decryption times. The
connection time is considered to be the time it takes for
a client to connect to the email server when sending or
opening an email.
1) Key derivation, encryption, and decryption for email
messages with a single recipient: Table IV shows the
sender’s and recipient’s network connection time; as well
as the key derivation, encryption and decryption time; for
emails containing only one recipient. The cipher text size is
included for reference.
TABLE IV
CONNECTION (CONN.), KEY DERIVATION (DER.), ENCRYPTION (ENC.)
AND DECRYPTION (DEC.) TIME FOR EMAILS WITH ONLY ONE RECIPIENT
Cipher Sender Recipient
Msg. size Conn. Der. Enc. Conn. Der. Dec.
(char) (char) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
524 875 4493 157 198 4926 153 698
3009 5670 4953 168 224 4583 172 813
10658 12944 5614 153 229 4922 144 935
There are two factors which contributed to the increase
in cipher text size. First, the padding scheme used by AES
(a block cipher) could have added a few bytes (no more
than the 16 byte block size) of padding to the message.
Second, and more importantly, a random number r and all
yi’s needed to be appended at the end of the message as
part of the cryptosystem. Therefore, the size of a cipher text
is approximately the sum of the size of the message, the
random number r, and all yi’s.
2) Encryption and decryption for email messages with
multiple recipients: Emails were sent to multiple recipients
to measure how the system scaled with the number of email
recipients. The marginal increase in transmission time was
consistent for larger numbers of recipients and so, for the
sake of brevity, we show only the results of two and three
recipient emails. The connection times were also omitted
because of the lack of variance in the values (see Table IV
for typical connection times). The results of the two and
three recipient tests are shown in Tables V and VI.
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TABLE V
KEY DERIVATION (DER.), ENCRYPTION (ENC.) AND DECRYPTION
(DEC.) TIME FOR EMAILS WITH TWO RECIPIENTS
Sender Recipient1 Recipient2
Msg. Der. Enc. Der. Dec. Der. Dec.
(char) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
524 335 202 103 681 98 662
3009 349 226 96 892 112 824
10658 389 276 101 1064 116 922
TABLE VI
KEY DERIVATION (DER.), ENCRYPTION (ENC.) AND DECRYPTION
(DEC.) TIME FOR EMAILS WITH THREE RECIPIENTS
Sender Recipient1 Recipient2 Recipient3
Msg. Der. Enc. Der. Dec. Der. Dec. Der. Dec.
(char) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
524 477 192 105 668 109 662 102 676
3009 498 212 96 876 112 824 107 864
10658 481 296 101 998 116 922 112 972
F. Results Summary
The experimental result can be summarized as follows:
1) Cryptosystem parameter setup, including the mas-
ter key generation (rBits=256, qBits=512 and MK-
Bits=512 bits) takes ≈ 1 second.
2) Key pair generation during user registration takes ≈ .1
seconds.
3) Connecting to an email server using the Java Mail
library requires 4 to 6 seconds. It takes a fraction of a
second to encrypt or decrypt messages, and that speed
(throughput per second) is independent of the email’s
size and recipient count.
4) The key derivation time is roughly the same for each
recipient. However, the sender’s key derivation time
is directly proportional to the number of recipients.
These results match the theoretical analysis from Table
I.
5) The increase in cipher size is slight and independent
of the plain text size, so the scheme has no storage
concerns.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a secure and efﬁcient identity-based
one-way group key agreement protocol which can be in-
tegrated with an email service application to provide P2P
encryption. The scheme’s security was proved in Section V
and its efﬁciency was analyzed in Section VI, in which Table
I gave a detailed theoretic comparison between the proposed
P2P email encryption scheme and the current Gmail HTTPS
always-on option. Experiments were conducted to measure
the performance of the proposed P2P-EES in Section VII.
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